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Abstract
This paper incorporates imperfect divisibility of money in a price
game where a given number of identical rms produce a homogeneous
product at constant unit cost up to capacity. We nd necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
Unlike in the continuous action space case, under discrete pricing there
may be a range of symmetric pure strategy equilibria - which we fully
characterize - a range which may or may not include the competitive
price. Also, we determine the maximum number of such equilibria
when competitive pricing is itself an equilibrium.
J. E. L. Classication: C72, D41, D43, L11, L13.
Keywords: Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, Price game, Oligopoly,
Pure strategy equilibrium, Discrete pricing.
1 Introduction
In theoretical work on price competition among sellers of a homogeneous
product, the price is customarily viewed as a continuous choice variable.
This is an analytical simplication since there is in fact a minimum currency
denomination (e. g., a cent). Once this is recognized, one has to reconsider
the issue of the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium (henceforth, PSE)
in a Bertrand-Edgeworth game. This has been done by Dixon (1993) and
very recently by Chowdhury (2008) under strict convexity of costs, a setting
where a PSE does not exist in the continuous-action space model (Tirole,
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1988, p. 214). Assuming the rms to choose rst price and next output (each
rm producing the minimum between its competitive supply at the set price
and its forthcoming demand), a su¢ cient condition is established by Dixon
for the existence of PSE under e¢ cient rationing, a condition that holds in
a su¢ ciently large industry. Chowdhuri focuses mainly on a simultaneous
price and quantity game. For a large class of rationing rules, he proves that,
with su¢ ciently many identical rms, all rms charging the lowest feasible
price above the competitive price 1 is the unique symmetric PSE.
In the continuous-action space model, existence of PSE is also problem-
atic when unit cost is constant up to capacity (Vives, 1986). We incorporate
imperfect divisibility of money in this setup, assuming symmetric oligopoly,
a decreasing and concave demand function and e¢ cient rationing. Section 2
nds necessary and su¢ cient conditions for existence of a PSE and multiplic-
ity of symmetric PSE. The ndings can be summarized as follows. A pivotal
role is played by the highest uniform price that is not worth undercutting
(p): this is at least as high as the competitive price (pw). If competitive
pricing is an equilibrium, then there are multiple symmetric PSE so long as
p > pw, any uniform price from pw to p being a PSE. If instead competitive
pricing is not an equilibrium, then p is denitely higher than pw and a PSE
will exist if and only if a unilateral price increase is unworthy at market price
p: then the set of symmetric PSE will include any uniform price from p
down to the lowest price at which a unilateral price increase is not worth it.
Section 3 claries the role of the size of the market and the minimum cur-
rency denomination. In the former connection we derive, from an industry
where a PSE does not exist, a family of larger industries by applying Dixons
(1993) "replication" procedure. In a su¢ ciently large replica industry, all
rms charging p becomes a PSE and, with further increases in the industry
size, the range of symmetric PSE extends downwards to include the com-
petitive price. Concerning the size of the minimum currency denomination
(), we show that, if competitive pricing is not an equilibrium with contin-
uous pricing, then no PSE exists with discrete pricing either, provided  is
su¢ ciently small. A second result relates to the case where there are several
symmetric PSE including competitive pricing. As  decreases, the number
of symmetric PSE tends to increase up to a well-dened maximum while at
the same time the price converges asymptotically to pw at any equilibrium.
Section 4 briey concludes and the Appendix contains proofs of main results.
1Competitive price is identied with marginal cost at zero output, c0(0). This iden-
tication relies on the following argument. Let there be n < 1 price-taking potential
entrants. Under strict cost convexity, there will be n active rms, and the competitive
price will converge to c0(0) (under perfect divisibility of money) as n increases.
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2 The model
There are n rms, each producing a homogeneous good at constant unit cost
(normalized to zero) up to capacity q = Q=n, where Q is total capacity. R+
and I+ = fkg are the sets of nonnegative reals and integers, respectively.
Demand and the inverse demand function are D(p) and P (Q), respectively,
Q being total output. In the real domain, D0(p) < 0 and D00(p)  0 for
p 2 (0; p); where D(p) = 0 at p  p and D(p) > 0 at p < p. We denote by
D0(p) the derivative ofD at some specied price p. The set of feasible prices
is fkg;  > 0 being the minimum currency denomination. The competitive
price, pw, is 0 if D(0)  Q and P (Q) if D(0)  Q. (With D(0) > Q we let
P (Q) 2 fkg, so that a competitive equilibrium exists.) In the price game
the rms choose prices, whereupon the buyers make purchasing decisions.
i(pi; p i) denotes rm is payo¤at strategy prole (p1; :::; pn) and i(p0i; p i)
its payo¤ if deviating to p0i. Symmetric pure strategy proles (p; :::; p) are
referred to as p and is associated payo¤ as i(p), where i(p) = pD(p)=n
for p > pw. We let p = maxfp1; :::; png; H = fi : pi = pg, and #H = n.
Rationing is according to the e¢ cient rule: thus, if n = 1, i(pi; p i) =
pminfq;maxf0; D(p)  (n  1)qgg for i 2 H. Note that p[D(p)  (n  1)q] <
i(p) at any p 2 (pw; p). We let ep = argmaxp2fkg p[D(p)   (n   1)q] ande = ep[D(ep)   (n   1)q]: ep is within  of ep 2 R+, ep being the solution of
D(p)  (n  1)q + pD0(p) = 0. Further, e = ep[D(ep)  (n  1)q].
It is easily seen when competitive pricing is an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (i) With pw  0; pw is an equilibrium i¤
(pw + )

Q D(pw + )
q
 1; if pw  0; (1)
which can be written
(n  1)q  D() if pw = 0: (2)
(ii) In the continuous action space case ( = 0), pw is an equilibrium i¤
 pwD0(pw)
q
 1 if pw > 0 (1)
and
(n  1)q  D(0) if pw = 0 (2)
Proof. (i) (1) derives from pwq  (pw + ) [D(pw + )  (n  1)q]: necessity
of the latter is obvious, su¢ ciency follows from D00  0. (ii) (1) derives from
d
dp
[p(D(p)  (n  1)q)]
p=pw
(+)  0; (2) is obvious.
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Remark 1. (10) and (20) are slightly stricter than (1) and (2), respectively:
thus, if pw is an equilibrium with  = 0, a fortiori it is so with  > 0.
With  = 0, no p > pw can be an equilibrium: by innitesimally un-
dercutting, the rms output jumps up and prot increases since the fall in
revenue per unit is negligible. With discrete pricing, at any p > pw let
ijpi(p) be the change in is prot if deviating from p by pi. At p 2
[P (q)+; p] it pays to undercut: ijpi= (p) = (p )D(p ) (pD(p)=n);
which is positive at p > . Also, a unilateral price increase leads to zero prot
when D(p+pi)  (n  1)q. Here are further results on ijpi(p).
Lemma 1. (i) With p 2 (pw; P (q) + ], ijpi= (p) is increasing in
p. (ii) Let p 2 [pw; P ((n   1)q)   ) and consider any pi > 0 such that
D(p+pi) > (n  1)q: then dijpi(p)=dp is decreasing in p.
Proof. (i) ijpi= (p) = (p  )q   pD(p)n ; which is increasing in p.
(ii)ijpi(p) = (p+pi)[D(p+pi) (n 1)q] pD(p)n , hence
dijpi (p)
dp
=
[D(p+pi) (n 1)q D(p)n ]+(p+pi)D0(p+pi) pD
0(p)
n
. Thus
dijpi (p)
dp
<
0 since D(p+pi)  (n  1)q < D(p)n and (p+pi)D0(p+pi) < pD
0(p)
n
.
One necessary condition for p > pw to be an equilibrium is that at p it
does not pay to undercut. ijpi= (p)  0 i¤ (p  )q  pD(p)=n; i. e., i¤
p  Q
Q D(p) : (3)
Let p be the highest p 2 fkg \ [pw; P (q)] meeting (3) and let bp 2 R+
solve (3) as equality over the range [pw; P (q)]: Of course, bp > pw and p =
fkg \ (bp   ; bp]. We have the following result on p.
Lemma 2. p   when pw = 0; with p  2 i¤ Q  2D(2); p  P (Q)
when pw = P (Q) > 0; with p  pw +  i¤ Q D(pw+)
D(pw+)
pw

 1:
Proof. With pw = 0, p  2 if 2  Q
Q D(2) ; i. e., Q  2D(2); while p = 
if Q > 2D(2). With pw = P (Q) > 0, p  pw +  if (3) holds at p = pw + ,
i. e., Q D(p
w+)
D(pw+)
pw

 1; if not, then p = pw.
We can now address equilibrium multiplicity when pw is an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Let pw be an equilibrium. Then: (i) the set of symmetric
PSE is made up of any p : p 2 fkg\ [pw; p]; (ii) if pw = 0 there are further
symmetric PSE besides 0 and  i¤ Q  2D(2); if pw > 0 there are further
symmetric PSE besides pw i¤ Q D(p
w+)
D(pw+)
pw

 1:
Proof. (i) Sinceijpi>0(p
w)  0, by Lemma 1 a price increase is unworthy
at any p 2 [pw; p). Undercutting is also unworthy at any p 2 [pw; p].
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(ii) This follows from Lemma 2.
Examples. 1: D(p) = 50:4   12p; n = 24, q = 2;  = :01. Then pw =
:20, and pw is an equilibrium ((1) holds); p = :32, hence any p : p 2
f:20; :21; :::; :32g is a PSE. 2: D(p) = 60  10p; n = 10, q = 2;  = :01. Then
pw = 4; pw is an equilibrium and a unique one since p = 4.
PSE may exist even when pw is not an equilibrium. Before seeing this,
two points must preliminarily be made. First we have
Lemma 3. Suppose ijpi= (p+ )  0: then ijpi=(p) < 0.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Secondly, when pw is not an equilibrium, undercutting is denitely un-
worthy at p close enough to pw.
Lemma 4. Suppose pw is not an equilibrium. Then: (i) p 2 [pw +
; P (q)]; (ii) p 2 [2; P (q)] if pw = 0 and  is not an equilibrium; (iii) i(p)
is increasing for p 2 fpw; pw + ; :::; pg:
Proof. In the Appendix.
Now, p is an obvious equilibrium candidate since at p an -price increase
is unworthy (by Lemma 3, ijpi=(p
) < 0 because ijpi= (p
+) >
0). However, for p to be an equilibrium it has to be ijpi(p
)  0 for
any pi > 0: We have this result.
Proposition 3 Let pw not be an equilibrium. Then: (i) p is an equilibrium
i¤ i(p)  e. Holding this, let p 2 fkg\(pw; p] be such that i(p ) <e  i(p). The set of symmetric PSE is made up of any p : p 2 fkg \
[p; p]. (ii) There are no (symmetric or asymmetric) PSE i¤ e > i(p).
Proof. In the Appendix.
Remark 2. (i) By concavity of p[D(p)  (n  1)q] and since p[D(p)  (n 
1)q] < i(p) for p 2 (pw; p), a su¢ cient condition for p to be an equilibrium
is ep  p. (ii) If pw is not an equilibrium, there will normally be several (if
any) symmetric PSE, p being the only one i¤ i(p ) < e  i(p).
3 Comparative statics
We now see how the size of the market and of the minimum currency denom-
ination a¤ect the equilibrium. Let us begin with the former. Given  and
q, an industry is a "demand function-number of rms" pair. Suppose there
is no PSE in industry (D(p); n): by Lemma 4 and Prop. 3, ep > p > pw
and e > i(p) > i(pw). To generate industries of di¤erent size, we adopt
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Dixons (1993) replication procedure: from (D(p); n) a family of larger in-
dustries is derived, (D(r)(p); n(r)) =(rD(p); rn), where r > 1 and rn 2 I+.
Letting x be the value of some variable in industry (D(p); n), x(r) denotes
its value in the "r-replica" industry. Note that pw(r) = pw, p(r) = p; and
i(p(r)) = i(p) while ep(r) is decreasing in r and e(r) is also decreasing
(so long as ep(r) > pw): for D(0) 6= n, ep(r) = pw and e(r) = i(pw) at
some r. (With D(0) = n, ep(r) converges asymptotically to 0.) It follows im-
mediately that p is an equilibrium in a su¢ ciently large r-replica industry;
also, the set of symmetric PSE includes pw when r is su¢ ciently large.
Proposition 4 Let there be no PSE in industry (D(p); n). Then, in in-
dustry (D(r)(p); n(r)): (i) p is an equilibrium for any r  r0, r0 being the
smallest r such that rn 2 I+ and e(r)  i(p); (ii) with r  r0, the set of
symmetric PSE is made up of any p : p 2 fkg \ [p(r); p]g where p(r) is
nonincreasing in r and p(r) = pw for r  r00, r00 being the smallest r such
that rn 2 I+ and (pw + )[rD(pw + )  (rn  1)q]  i(pw).2
Example. With  = :01 and q = 2, consider the industry (D(p) = 4:2  
p; n = 2). Then pw = :2, i(pw) = :4; p = :32, and i(p) = :62. There is
no PSE: ep = 1:1 and e = 1:21 > i(p) > i(pw). It is easily checked that
r0 = 3, hence p is an equilibrium in any r-replica industry with r  3. In
fact, ep(r0) = :43 and e(r0) = :56 < :62. One can also check that p(r0) =
:29; so that there are four symmetric PSE in the r0-replica industry. As r
increases the set of symmetric PSE increases: with r  r00 = 10 any p 2{pw;
pw + ; :::; pg is an equilibrium.
To see the relevance of the size of the minimum currency denomination,
we now allow for changes in  while taking D(p); n; and q as given. We
write ep(), e(), p(), and i(p()) since they all depend on .3 Obviously,
lim!0 ep() = ep and lim!0 e() = e. As to p() and i(p()), we have
Lemma 5. (i) Let Q  2D(0) if pw = 0 and  D0(pw)
Q
pw  1 if pw > 0.
Then, for any  > 0, p() =  if pw = 0 and p() = pw if pw > 0. (ii)
Let Q < 2D(0) if pw = 0 and  D
0(pw)
Q
pw < 1 if pw > 0. Then, for  small
2For comparison, let us review the main point made by Dixon through his replication
procedure under strict cost convexity. As in our model, pw(r) = pw and p(r) = p. Now,
at p let rm i deviate to p + : then its residual demand is decreasing in r and falls to
zero when r increases above some critical level (call it br): r > br is the condition Dixon
draws attention to - clearly, a su¢ cient condition for p to be an equilibrium.
3In contrast, pw does not depend on . (To preserve existence of the competitive
equilibrium, with P (Q) > 0 only values of  such that P (Q) 2 fkg are being considered.)
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enough: (ii.a) p()  2 if pw = 0 and p()  pw+  if pw > 0; (ii.b) p()
is non-decreasing in ; lim!0 p() = pw and lim!0 i(p()) = i(pw).
Proof. (i), (ii.a) These follow from Lemma 2, D0 < 0, and D00  0.
(ii) This follows from dbp()=d > 0 and lim!0 bp() = pw:
This is a crucial result since p  p at any symmetric PSE. One con-
sequence is that, if pw is not an equilibrium in the continuous action space
case, then no PSE exists with discrete pricing provided  is small enough.
Proposition 5 Suppose pw is not an equilibrium in the continuous action
space case. Then, if  > 0 is su¢ ciently small, no PSE exists.
Proof. Under the stated conditions, i(pw) < e. For  su¢ ciently small,
pw is not an equilibrium: i(pw) < e() and p() > pw. Furthermore, by
Lemma 5, for  su¢ ciently small i(p()) < e() and no PSE exists.
The size of  also matters when pw is an equilibrium. Let h 2 I+ :
p() = pw + (h   1); so that h = fkg \ [pw; p()]. Note that h is
the number of symmetric PSE when pw is itself an equilibrium. We also letbh 2 R+ : bp() = pw + (bh   1), hence bh = [(bp()   pw)=] + 1 while
h = [(p() pw)=]+1. We can now address equilibrium multiplicity in the
event of pw being an equilibrium.
Proposition 6 Suppose pw is an equilibrium in the continuous action space
case. (i) Let Q  2D(0) if pw = 0 and  D0(pw)
Q
pw  1 if pw > 0. Then, for
any  > 0: 0 and  are the only symmetric PSE (h = 2) if pw = 0 and pw is
the unique symmetric PSE (h = 1) if pw > 0. (ii) Let Q < 2D(0) if pw = 0
and  D
0(pw)
Q
pw < 1 if pw > 0. Then: (ii.a) with  > 0 small enough, h  3
if pw = 0 and h  2 if pw > 0; (ii.b) h increases or remains constant as 
decreases; (ii.c) maxh = I+ \ [ Q
Q D(pw) pwD0(pw) ;
Q
Q D(pw) pwD0(pw) + 1).
Proof. In the Appendix.
Note that, when there are several symmetric PSE including pw, any equi-
librium price converges to pw as  ! 0: this is because p  p at any
symmetric PSE and lim!0 p() = pw.
Examples. Here are two examples to illustrate statement (ii) of Prop. 6.
1: D(p) = 50:4   12p; n = 24, q = 2. Then pw = :2 and pw is an
equilibrium for any . For  = :2, p() = 1 and h = 5; for  = :01,
p() = :32 and h = 13; for  = :0001, p() = 0:2019 and h = 20. Note
that maxh = I+ \ [20; 21) = 20.
2: D(p) = 52  p; n = 14, q = 2. Then pw = 24 and pw is an equilibrium
for any . For  > 4, p() = 24 and h = 1: pw is the unique symmetric
PSE. For any   4, p() = pw +  (h = maxh = I+ \ [28
24
; 52
24
) = 2).
7
4 Conclusion
We have studied discrete pricing when identical price-setting rms produce
a homogeneous commodity at constant unit cost up to capacity. Necessary
and su¢ cient conditions have been found for the existence of a PSE and
for multiplicity of symmetric PSE. We have seen that, with discrete pricing,
there may exist PSE even when competitive pricing is not an equilibrium,
although such an event does not occur when the minimum fraction () of the
money unit is su¢ ciently small. Also, the existence of several symmetric PSE
including competitive pricing is a concrete possibility and we have computed
the maximum number of such equilibria, obtaining for  small enough.
Thus discrete pricing may lead to quite di¤erent results compared to the
continuous-action space model. On the other hand, one basic prediction of
that model - that the rms earn the competitive prot at any PSE of the
price game - is not fundamentally misleading: if  is su¢ ciently small, then
either a PSE does not exist or the price must be equal to or cannot di¤er
signicantly from the competitive price at any symmetric PSE.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3. Sinceijpi= (p+ )  0; then p+ > pw if pw > 0
and p +   2 if pw = 0. Let qijpi(p) be the change in is output when
deviating from p by pi: then ijpi= (p+ ) = pqijpi= (p+ )  
D(p+)
n
and ijpi=(p) = pqijpi=(p) + maxf0; D(p + )   (n   1)qg.
Obviously, ijpi=(p) < 0 at p 2 [P ((n   1)q)   ; p   ], hence we focus
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on p 2 (pw; P ((n  1)q)  ). Here,  qijpi=(p) = [D(p)=n]  [D(p+ ) 
(n  1)q] and qijpi= (p+ ) = q  [D(p+ )=n]: Letting  qijpi=(p) =
qijpi= (p+ ) +  (where  > 0),
4 it is found that  ijpi=(p) =
p[qijpi= (p+ ) + ]   [D(p + )   (n   1)q]: The right-hand side is
larger than ijpi= (p+ ) since D(p + )   (n   1)q < D(p+)n . Thus
ijpi=(p) < 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Since ijpi=(p
w) > 0, then by Lemma 3,
ijpi= 
(pw+) < 0: at pw+ it does not pay to undercut. Further, p 
P (q) since prot is certainly raised by undercutting when p 2 [P (q) + ; p].
(ii) The argument runs as above.
(iii) The statement follows from concavity of i(p) and i(p)  (p  
)q  i(p ); where at least one inequality is strict. This last fact is
obvious when p > pw+ since then (p )q > i(p ) =(p )D(p )=n.
It is also obvious when p = pw +  = : then i(p) > i(p ) = 0. When
p = pw +  > , we distinguish among two cases. If p is an equilibrium,
then i(p)  e while e > i(p ) since pw = p    and pw is not an
equilibrium: If p is not an equilibrium, then e > i(p) and ep > p. If it
were i(p) = i(p ) it would be
h
di(p)
dp
i
p=p
< 0 and hence a fortiorih
d
dp
(pD(p)  (n  1)q)
i
p=p
< 0; contrary to the fact that e > i(p).
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) If i(p)  e, a unilateral price increase is
unworthy at p. It is also unworthy at p and, by statement (iii) of Lemma
4, at any p in between. Undercutting is also unworthy, by denition of p:
(ii) Given statement (iii) of Lemma 4, it follows from e > i(p) thate > i(p) at p < p: at any p < p, is prot is raised by deviating toep. Next, we dispose of asymmetric strategy proles with D(p) < Q (those
with D(p)  Q are immediately ruled out.) Let i(pi; p i) > 0 for i 2 H
(otherwise our case is obvious), so that D(p) (n n)q > 0 and j(pj; p j) =
pjq for j =2 H. If pj < p   for some j, then any such j has not made a best
reply because j(p0j; p j) = p
0
jq for p
0
j 2 (pj; p).
We are left with strategy proles such that D(p) < Q and pj = p   for
all j =2 H. Suppose rst D(p  )  (n  n)q  q. If is prot (for i 2 H) is
not raised by deviating to p  , i. e., (p  )q  pD(p) (n n)q
n
, then it pays for
j =2 H to deviate to p: it is (p  )q < pD(p) (n 1 n)q
1+n
because D(p) (n 1 n)q
1+n
>
D(p) (n n)q
n
. Note that it is necessarily D(p  )  (n  n)q > q when n > 1
and p  ep, the last inequality implying D(p)  (n   1)q > 0. Next consider
strategy proles such that p > ep; n > 1; and D(p  )  (n n)q < q. Then it
4Note that  qijpi=(p) > qijpi= (p+ ) since (n 1)[Q D(p+)] > [Q D(p)].
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pays for i 2 H to deviate to p 2, i. e., (p 2)q > pD(p) (n n)q
n
: In fact, this
condition amounts to 2
p
nq
Q D(p) < 1; which certainly holds:
nq
Q D(p) 2 (1; 2)
since D(p) < (n   n)q + q and n > 1, and 2=p  1=2 since p  4 (due to
p > ep > p > ). Finally, consider strategy proles such that n = 1. These
are easily dismissed if p 6= ep.5 If instead p = ep; then i 2 H would be better o¤
by deviating to p  2. To see this, note that, since ep > p and given Lemma
1, at ep it pays to undercut, hence nq < ep[Q D(ep)]. Consequently, at the
asymmetric strategy proles under consideration it pays i 2 H to deviate toep 2: the resulting payo¤ (ep 2)q can in fact be checked to be higher thanep[D(ep)  (n  1)q] so long as 2q < ep[Q D(ep)].
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) and (ii.a) follow from Lemma 2 and D00  0:
(ii.b) We rst show that dbh=d < 0. By the denition of bp and bh;
bh   1  Q
Q D(pw + (bh   1)) + p
w

= 0 (4)
With pw = 0; it can easily be seen that dbh=d < 0. With pw > 0, implicit
di¤erentiation yields
dbh
d
=
QD0(bh   1)2 + (Q D)2pw
2[(Q D)2   QD0] ; (5)
where D0 and D are evaluated at p = bp. Then dbh=d < 0 if and only if
QD0(bh   1)2 + (Q   D)2pw < 0. Note that (Q   D)2pw = (Q   D)[Q  
(bh   1)(Q D)]; hence the desidered inequality becomes Q[D0(bh   1) +
(Q D)]  (bh  1)(Q D)2 < 0. It su¢ ces that D0(bh  1) +Q D  0;
or, more thoroughly:
Q D(bp)
(bh   1)   D0(bp): (6)
As soon as bh  2,6 validity of (6) follows from D00  0. Finally, since
dbh=d < 0, h decreases or stays constant as  decreases. (This follows since
p() bp() 2 [0; ) and any change in h is not less than 1 in absolute value.)
(ii.c) Recalling the denition of bh and using lHopitals rule, lim!0 bh =
lim!0(dbp()=dp)+1. By the denition of bp(), (bp  )q  [bpD(bp)=n] = 0,
so that dbp=d = Q
Q D(bp) bpD0(bp) and lim!0 bh = QQ D(pw) pwD0(pw)+1: (More
5In particular, with p > ep; deviating to p    yields (p   )D(p   )=n, higher than
(p  )[D(p  )  (n  1)q]; in its turn higher than is initial payo¤, p[D(p)  (n  1)q].
6For  su¢ ciently small, h  2 because of statement (ii.a) and the fact that bh  h.
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specically, lim!0 bh = QQ D(pw) + 1 if pw = 0 and lim!0 bh =   QpwD0(pw) + 1
if pw > 0.) Thus we are done because h  bh and, at any ; bh < lim!0 bh.
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